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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT WORK: LAW, POLITICS, AND ETHICS. By 
Bron Raymond Taylor. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
1991. Pp. xvii, 251. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95. 
Few would disagree that affirmative action is one of the most con-
troversial and hotly debated issues of our time. As with other issues 
that inflame the passions to a high degree, many people have firmly 
held opinions on affirmative action deeply rooted in what they con-
sider to be inviolable principles. In Affirmative Action at Work, Bron 
Taylor1 seeks to identify the moral and ethical principles upon which 
those on all sides of the debate rest their convictions. In so doing, 
Taylor sorts through the complicated and often contradictory argu-
ments advanced by opponents and proponents of affirmative action 
alike. 
The framework for Taylor's analysis is the quantitative and quali-
tative data compiled during a study of the affirmative action program 
implemented by the California State Department of Parks and Recrea-
tion. In his study, Taylor interviewed and sent questionnaires to peo-
ple at all levels of the Parks Department's hierarchy, asking them to 
respond to a variety of questions regarding affirmative action generally 
and the department's affirmative action program specifically. Taylor 
uses this information to categorize and critique the commonly ad-
vanced arguments, and he attempts to discern why different groups of 
people view affirmative action differently. 
Taylor's book has a different focus from the spate of recent books 
that argue for or against affirmative action on legal or moral grounds. 2 
Instead of persuading the reader to take a particular position on af-
firmative action, Taylor's purpose is to examine the debate itself. For . 
Taylor, the affirmative action controversy presents in sharp relief the 
conflict between social justice and individual rights and thus "provides 
an appropriate window through which to examine moral meaning in 
our culture" (p. 10). Further, because affirmative action has been em-
ployed in a culture adhering to philosophical liberalism,3 it necessarily 
1. Assistant Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, University of Wisconsin. 
2. See, e.g., HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER CENTURY OF AF· 
FIRMATIVE ACTION (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Robert A. Sedler. - Ed.); STE· 
PHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); SHELBY STEELE, 
THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990); MELVIN I. 
UROFSKY, A CoNFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991) 
(reviewed in this issue by Professor Robert A. Sedler. - Ed.); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE 
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991) (reviewed in this 
issue by Professor Robin West. - Ed.). 
3. Taylor defines liberalism as "[t]he enlightenment philosophy that is the dominant social 
philosophy in the United States. Its key tenets are shared by political liberals, conservatives, and 
libertarians. These tenets include: rights inhere to the individual; people are self-interested, ac-
quisitive, maximizing consumers ••.• " Pp. 235-36. 
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tests the legitimacy of one of liberalism's central tenets: that jobs and 
benefits in a society of equal opportunity should be distributed on the 
basis of talent and merit - which Taylor refers to as the merit princi-
ple (pp. 7-9). To Taylor, then, the affirmative action debate reduces to 
a referendum on the larger issue of whether the merit principle is an 
appropriate foundation for our system of distributive justice. 
In Part I of his book, Taylor provides the legal background to af-
firmative action. Though not a lawyer, Taylor does an impressive job 
of succinctly and accurately summarizing the relevant statutes and 
case law.4 Next, Taylor conducts a brief review of several major 
schools of ethical thought and sets forth some basic terminology used 
by ethical theorists. 
In Chapter Two, Taylor launches into a rather esoteric ethical 
analysis of the various conceptualizations of the affirmative action is-
sue. According to Taylor, ethical analyses of affirmative action fall 
into four basic categories: ''justice as freedom, justice as fairness, jus-
tice as productive freedom, and justice as the greatest good" (p. 37). 
For each category, Taylor first reviews the ethical theory of one of its 
chief proponents, and then applies a contemporary version of the ap-
proach to the affirmative action controversy. 
Taylor argues that viewing justice as freedom, as libertarians and 
conservatives generally do, causes one to reject preferential5 affirma-
tive action because it impinges upon individual autonomy (p. 56). In 
contrast, a conception of justice as fairness, according to Taylor, leads 
one to conclude that affirmative action is morally required to counter-
act the disadvantages of not being a white male (p. 57). It is upon this 
view of justice as fairness, Taylor asserts, that contemporary liberal 
support of affirmative action rests. A third theory of justice focuses on 
productive freedom and reflects Marxist notions of distributive fair-
ness. Because liberal equal opportunity is not considered desirable ac-
cording to Marxist principles, Taylor argues, it is unclear whether 
such a conception of justice would sustain the use of affirmative action 
programs (p. 69). Equally ambiguous is whether a consequentialist 
view of justice, which analyzes policies in terms of their overall contri-
bution to the good of society, would endorse affirmative action. Ac-
cording to Taylor, a determination whether affirmative action 
contributes to the overall good is inherently subjective, depending on 
4. Taylor concludes his review of the relevant case law by predicting that, in light of the 
current conservative makeup of the Supreme Court and the logic of recent cases, "preferential, 
goal-type affirmative action will be further narrowed by judicial rulings but will remain a permis-
sible remedy for specific cases of demonstrable discrimination." P. 33. However, Taylor does 
not provide the reader with the specific basis for his prediction. 
5. Taylor distinguishes between "protective" affirmative action, in which there is strict en-
forcement of antidiscrimination laws but no consideration of race or gender in hiring decisions, 
and "preferential" affirmative action, in which preference is given to individuals who are mem-
bers of historically subjugated groups. Pp. 12-13. 
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which of many consequences are considered desirable and the relative 
values that people assign to them (pp. 69-70). 
Part II of Affirmative Action at Work reviews Taylor's empirical 
research, which consisted of studying the attitudes of employees in the 
California State Department of Parks and Recreation toward affirma-
tive action. 6 At the outset of Part II, Taylor sets forth four major 
purposes of his research and analysis. His first objective was to deter-
mine whether and to what extent the various subgroups affected by 
affirmative action - white men, white women, nonwhite men, and 
nonwhite women - view affirmative action from different moral and 
ethical perspectives. Second, Taylor sought to test his prediction that, 
based on self-interest, white men tend to oppose affirmative action 
while others generally support it. The third focus of inquiry was to 
determine whether the ethical and moral underpinnings of various at-
titudes toward affirmative action "reinforce or challenge the modes of 
economic distribution that accompany a Liberal market society" (p. 
76). In particular, Taylor wanted to know whether different socioeco-
nomic groups bring different ethical norms to the affirmative action 
debate and whether such norms comport with or challenge our liberal 
market society's notion of distributive justice - that preferred jobs 
and salaries should be distributed on the basis of merit (pp. 76-77). 
Last of all, Taylor's research sought to determine the extent to which a 
person's sense of individualism influences his or her opinion of affirma-
tive action, and more specifically, whether white men eschew group-
sensitive approaches to social policies more than women and nonwhite 
men (p. 78). 
Next, Taylor summarizes the results of his qualitative research, 
which consisted of about fifty confidential interviews with Parks De-
partment employees. Taylor asked the employees specific questions 
about affirmative action as well as open-ended questions aimed at de-
termining whether the respondents rested their views on any particu-
lar moral principle. During his interviews, Taylor observed 
considerable hostility toward affirmative action, much of it from white 
males who felt that their careers had been irreparably damaged by the 
department's program (pp. 90-91). Also, the interviews revealed that 
there was a great deal of fear surrounding the issue of affirmative ac-
tion. Not only was there fear among white men that affirmative action 
would ruin their careers, but there was also fear, despite Taylor's as-
6. The department's affirmative action program, in existence since 1975, aims at increasing 
the number of women and nonwhite men employed by the agency. However, since the pro· 
gram's inception there has been a continuing debate over the purpose of the program. Some 
within the department argue that the program is intended to ensure that all applicants receive 
equal consideration by eliminating racial and gender bias from the selection process. Others 
contend that the program is aimed at increasing the number of women and nonwhites, and thus 
applicants from these groups should be hired if they are qualified, even if not necessarily the 
"best qualified" with regard to traditional credentials. Pp. 88-90. 
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surances of confidentiality, that expressing one's true feelings about 
affirmative action would invite reprisals by those on the other side of 
the issue or by the department itself {pp. 92-93). 
In addition, Taylor notes tJ;iat there was significant discomfort and 
confusion when respondents were asked to discuss the moral values 
most important to them. According to Taylor, "[q]uite often, long 
pauses suggested that a respondent rarely if ever reflected on his or her 
moral values" {p. 98). Moreover, between five and ten percent of 
those interviewed were ambivalent when asked about the legitimacy of 
affirmative action - although most respondents did have strong feel-
ings for or against affirmative action {p. 99). 
On the basis of the personal interviews, Taylor forge8 some tenta-
tive explanations of why people feel as they do about affirmative ac-
tion. Taylor observed that staunch opponents of affirmative action 
typically adhered strongly to the merit principle and other ethical 
norms in which concern for individual autonomy is paramount. Peo-
ple strongly opposed to affirmative action commonly objected that af-
firmative action is essentially reverse discrimination against whites, 
that people should be hired solely on the basis of merit, and that past 
discrimination does not justify sacrifices by white males who are not 
personally responsible for past injustices. From the interviews, Taylor 
concludes that the more importance someone places on the principle 
of individualism, the less likely he or she is to support affirmative ac-
tion and other group-conscious remedies {p. 111). 
Taylor also finds that those less firm in their opposition, but none-
theless against affirmative action, generally were so because of prag-
matic concerns about its consequences {pp. 103-05). Common 
concerns along these lines were that affirmative action leads to ineffi-
ciency by reducing the quality of employees and that such programs 
are not really needed, either because discrimination is no longer a 
problem or that the remedy, preferences based on race and gender, is 
worse than the problem itself. Taylor notes that supporters of affirma-
tive action generally expressed the same individualistic principles as 
did its opponents but that they tempered such feelings with concern 
for society as a whole {pp. 107, 111). Finally, people who strongly 
supported affirmative action, Taylor concludes, did so because they 
gave "their group or society as whole a clear and strong priority over 
the individual" {p. 111). 
Curiously, Taylor's discussion of the moral and ethical considera-
tions underlying various views of affirmative action makes no mention 
of racial animus or adherence to negative racial or gender stereotypes. 
For Taylor, a person's position on affirmative action is largely deter-
mined by the extent to which he or she adopts the principle of individ-
ualism. While this may have been true for some of the more 
thoughtful employees, there is little doubt that at least in some in-
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stances, other, less charitable forces were at work. Surely, among 
those most strongly opposed to affirmative action, some (but by no 
means all) felt the way they did out of unabashed hostility toward 
nonwhites and women. A little less obvious is the likelihood that 
many people who justified their strong opposition to affirmative action 
by relying on the merit principle may have done so on the basis of a 
conscious or unconscious belief that nonwhites and women are in-
nately less competent than white men.7 If one subscribes, whether in-
tentionally or not, to these traditional notions of inferiority, affirmative 
action programs by definition result in better-qualified white males be-
ing denied job,s. Regrettably, in his discussion of the interviews with 
Parks Department employees, Taylor fails to mention racism and sex-
ism as potential factors in the debate over affirmative action. 8 
In the next two chapters, Taylor summarizes and analyzes quanti-
tative data gathered from questionnaires completed by roughly five 
hundred employees at the Parks Department. As in the interviews, 
the respondents were asked a broad range of questions regarding af-
firmative action and the problems it presents. According to Taylor, 
[t]he most striking finding shown in this chapter is that while there was 
significant agreement among all groups that affirmative action is morally 
right, this consensus quickly broke down when affirmative action was 
discussed with greater specificity. When explicitly preferential types of 
affirmative action policies were mentioned, support dropped, and 
dropped most among white men. [p. 133] 
Unfortunately, many of Taylor's other findings are less provocative, 
and thus make for less interesting reading. For example, the survey 
responses confirmed that nonwhites and women feel more strongly 
than white men that prejudice is commonplace in our society, that 
liberals favor affirmative action more than conservatives, and that a 
greater percentage of women and nonwhites approve of group-ori-
ented policy approaches than do white males. 
The book's last chapter begins with a discussion of the four princi-
pal theoretical questions the research sought to address. First, Taylor 
concludes that the prevalent attitudes on affirmative action do indeed 
reflect the various approaches taken by social philosophers (p. 184). 
Second, as expected, the research confirms that historically oppressed 
groups approach the issue of affirmative action from a different ethical 
perspective than white males. In his study, Taylor found that non-
7. For an excellent discussion of unconscious race prejudice, see Charles R. Lawrence III, 
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
317 (1987). 
8. In an effort to determine whether and to what extent a person held racist or sexist atti· 
tudes, Taylor might have asked a person being interviewed for his or her opinion as to why 
women and nonwhite men have not, on average, achieved at the same level as white men. 
Although people rarely admit - to themselves or others - to having racist and sexist beliefs, 
such a question might have shed considerable light on the extent to which a person subscribed to 
negative stereotypes of women and nonwhites. 
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whites and women "are more likely than white men to evaluate princi-
ples of distributive justice, or policies such as affirmative action, by 
emphasizing the impact on their group or upon the overall social 
good" (p. 185). Third, while class, political ideology, job level, age, 
and religion influence a person's view of affirmative action, the princi-
pal determinant is whether the person is a member of a traditionally 
subjugated· group (p. 185). Fourth, Taylor concludes that because 
"[m]ost respondents did not demonstrate any significant critical dis-
tance from the dominant norms of distribution in the Liberal culture," 
the debate over affirmative action will not have a significant impact on 
the ethical and moral direction of our society (p. 185). 
Finally, Taylor evaluates the legitimacy of the common arguments 
for and against affirmative action in terms of the level of acceptance 
among those interviewed and surveyed. According to Taylor, the 
common libertarian and conservative arguments against affirmative 
action lack support in his data (p. 188). For example, the libertarian 
argument that regardless of its purpose, any use of racial classifications 
threatens fundamental rights received little support among Taylor's 
respondents. While recognizing that popular support or rejection of a 
particular argument is not a litmus test for moral righteousness, Tay-
lor argues that "[t]hose who experience an aggressive affirmative ac-
tion program :firsthand are well placed to offer testimony as to the 
actual effects of the policy - and few conclude it violates fundamental 
rights" (p. 189). In addition, Taylor concludes that a common con-
servative argument against affirmative action - that it violates the 
merit principle - persuades few people. Despite strong support in 
theory for the notion that preferred jobs and salaries should be based 
solely on merit, Taylor finds that when given specific examples, most 
people do not endorse a rigid application of the merit principle and 
that it "is not the decisive standpoint from which most people evaluate 
affirmative action" (p. 190). 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Taylor finds that a frequently 
advanced argument in support of affirmative action - that it is needed 
to compensate for past injustices to racial minorities and women -
had scant support among those participating in his research. 9 Overall, 
Taylor observes, few people found compensatory justifications for af-
firmative action persuasive (pp. 176-77). Nonetheless, Taylor con-
cludes that "[w]hen illuminated by [the] data, the arguments of 
liberals fare better than the arguments of libertarians and conserva-
tives" (p. 190). For example, people generally agreed that discrimina-
tion is prevalent in the workplace, and they believed that the Parks 
9. As with the "fundamental rights" issue, Taylor's finding that the people surveyed do not 
support this argument is not conclusive proof that it is invalid. It may well be that most people 
do not understand the cause-and-effect relationship between past discrimination and present con-
ditions and thus may not appreciate fully why compensation may be justified. 
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Department's affirmative action program was needed to ensure that 
nonwhites and women received fair consideration.10 
Moreover, according to Taylor, the real-world consequences of af-
firmative action, often a source of considerable disagreement between 
supporters and opponents of affirmative action, on balance, appeared 
more positive than negative (p. 192). Specifically, Taylor finds that 
most people agreed that women and nonwhite men would not get seri-
ous consideration for jobs without an affirmative action policy, that 
most people did not feel that affirmative action programs exacerbated 
existing tensions by dividing people along race and gender lines, and 
that few felt that affirmative action had resulted in unqualified people 
being hired and promoted (p. 194). Unfortunately, however, in the 
book's final chapter Taylor does not buttress his conclusions with spe-
cific data - a sharp contrast from the rest of the book - thus afford-
ing those in philosophical disagreement with his :findings a convenient 
means of dismissing his assessment of the affirmative action 
controversy. 
In sum, Affirmative Action at Work provides an excellent introduc-
tion to the legal and ethical issues that comprise the current debate 
over the legitimacy of affirmative action programs. Moreover, the 
book affords the reader a r~e insight into how members of the work 
force who, on a daily basis, see and feel the impact of affirmative ac-
tion view the issue. The reader who is well-acquainted with the affirm-
ative action controversy may find Taylor's review of his research 
unremarkable and little more than confirmation of intuitive percep-
tions of the affirmative action debate. Taylor's research may also be 
criticized for failing to consider the impact of racial and gender bias on 
how people view affirmative action. Overall, however, Taylor does an 
impressive job of sorting through the myriad arguments for and 
against affirmative action and discussing in a succinct and comprehen-
sible manner the competing ethical and moral principles implicated in 
this highly charged debate. 
- Michael K. Ross 
10. P. 192. Taylor writes: 
Most respondents saw discrimination as prevalent in society and in their workplace. Only 
white men were inconsistent on this point. They admitted to the existence of discrimination 
but did not think it was prevalent or affected chances within their own organizations. On 
this issue, where large majorities of nonwhites and women assert that prejudice was preva-
lent both in society and in their own workplace, I would submit that these traditionally 
excluded individuals are better situated than white men to evaluate the prevalence of 
discrimination. 
P. 192. 
